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TUNNELING IN CHICAGO CLAY: PIONEERING WORK IN GROUND CONTROL
Edward J. Cording
Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
119 W. Huntingdon St., Savannah, GA 31401

ABSTRACT
Early in his engineering career, Ralph Peck supervised the soil mechanics investigations during subway construction in the soft clays
in Chicago, working under the guidance of Karl Terzaghi. A major focus was to determine what should be done to minimize surface
settlements of the streets. Squeeze tests, in which clay displacements and construction events in the tunnel were observed, led to
changes that significantly reduced surface settlement. Squeeze test reports prepared by Peck and his soil mechanics team are
summarized and selected drawings illustrated. The work provides a first view of Peck’s observational method: “it demonstrated the
enormous practical benefits … that may be derived from simple but intelligently interpreted observations.” Over the past 70 years, it
has served as a standard for investigation and control of ground movement, examples of which are summarized at the end of the paper.

INTRODUCTION
From 1939 through 1941, Ralph Peck was Assistant Subway
Engineer in the Department of Subways and Traction of the
City of Chicago, Survey Section, supervising the Soil
Mechanics Laboratory during the construction of the Chicago
Subway. He was selected by and worked under the guidance
of Karl Terzaghi, who was consultant to the City. Ralph
Burke was chief engineer for the subway work, and Raymond
Knapp was head of the survey section.
One of the questions that arose early in construction was
“What should be done to reduce the settlement of the street
surface to a minimum” (Terzaghi, 1942a). Answering that
question became a major part of the work of Ralph Peck and
his soil mechanics team throughout the subway construction.
This paper focuses on that work, in particular the series of
field test sections, termed squeeze tests, they conducted in the
liner plate tunnels.
Ralph Peck, in presenting the first Stanley D. Wilson lecture,
in describing the squeeze test data, noted the May 9-12, 1939
date on the drawing projected on the screen and said “I can
almost guarantee you that 50 years ago this hour probably I or
some of my brothers on the soil mechanics team were in the
tunnel making these measurements.” He described how they
measured the squeeze of the clay into the tunnel during
excavation, and related it to the surface settlement. He noted
that, although the liner plate method had been used to
construct sewer tunnels in Chicago, and it was recognized that
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surface subsidence and damage occurred due to tunneling;
nobody associated construction procedures with specific
amounts of settlement. There had been no real understanding
of the causes of settlement; it was just known that it was
inevitable that settlement would occur (Peck, 1989).
From the perspective of the tunneling practice prior to 1939,
the investigations on the Chicago Subway can truly be
described as pioneering work in ground control. Looking
forward from 1939 to the present, the observations made by
Peck take on added significance, because they set a standard
for integrated field investigations relating tunneling
procedures to ground loss and surface settlement. The work
had an even broader significance for geotechnical engineering.
As Peck stated “The Chicago Subway project in the annals of
geotechnical engineering assumed an importance far beyond
its benefits at the time, largely because it demonstrated the
enormous practical benefits that occur from even crude
observations, crude at least in comparison to today’s
sophisticated instrumentation. Even today, it exemplifies the
benefits that may be derived from simple but intelligently
interpreted observations” (Peck, 1999).
Several investigations of ground movements around soft
ground tunnels that have built on the standard set in 1939 are
described at the end of the paper. The projects used more
sophisticated instrumentation, but, most importantly, the
ground movements were intelligently interpreted and
correlated with
detailed observation of construction
conditions. Observations have now gone from measuring,
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timing, and recording construction events in notebooks to
assembling and comparing digital records of key machine
functions and correlating them with continuous records of
ground movements and piezometric levels, which show how a
pressurized envelope is maintained around pressurized face
shields so that ground movements can be controlled to
negligible values.

soil mechanics laboratory, (2) Laboratory to be supervised by
an individual chosen by him and working under his
supervision, (3) Fee of $100 per day. Terzaghi’s fee was
greater than permitted by City rules so Ralph Burke had to go
before the city council to gain approval, which resulted in it
being picked up by the Chicago newspapers, bringing him and
soil mechanics to the community’s attention (Peck, 1975).

In addition to Peck’s lectures and published papers by Peck,
Terzaghi, and Knapp, I have drawn from a volume containing
carbon copies and blue prints of the squeeze test reports
prepared by Peck and his assistants (Soil Mechanics
Laboratory, 1939-1941. The reports provide detailed
descriptions of the construction conditions affecting ground
movements. Portions of drawings from the volume are
presented as figures in this paper.

At the time, Ralph Peck was at Harvard University, studying
under Arthur Casagrande and assisting in the soil mechanics
laboratory, after completing his PhD in structural engineering
at Rensselaer University and working for part of a year as a
structural detailer for American Bridge Company. Terzaghi,
on Casagrande’s advice, chose Peck to supervise the lab.

What stands out in reviewing the squeeze reports is the level
of relevant detail in the recorded observations. Over the
almost 3-year construction period on the Chicago Subway,
Peck applied the observational method in solving subway
construction problems. The content and organization of the
squeeze reports and drawings, and the way he worked on the
braced excavations (Peck, 1942) and other aspects of the
Chicago subway project provided a first view of the
engineering approach that has been so apparent to those who
later studied and worked with him --- integration of theory and
practice; use of precedents; field observations. He later
formalized the observational method, but, more importantly,
he was always observing --- the ground, construction
conditions, ground behavior and response of structures. He
has stated that “the most valuable instrument is an observant
eye coupled to an inquiring mind.”

THE CHICAGO SUBWAY INVESTIGATIONS BEGIN
Ralph Peck in his paper “Karl Terzaghi and the Chicago
Subway” (1975), not only describes Terzaghi’s role but his
own participation, early in his engineering career, in these
pioneering investigations. Additional, fascinating insights can
be obtained by referring to the volume edited by John
Dunnicliff and Nancy Peck Young (2006) in which Peck
describes how he and Marjorie Peck arrived in Chicago and
the work began.
In December 1938, as construction was beginning on the
Chicago Subway, Karl Terzaghi gave a lecture in Chicago
entitled “The Dangers of Constructing Subways in Soft Clay
Beneath Large Cities.” His previous experience with the soft
clays around the Great Lakes was on the excavation of piers in
plastic clay for the foundations of Hudson’s Store in Detroit.
However, his descriptions of the consequences of tunneling
were so graphic (Peck noted that he figuratively scared the
audience to death) that he found both the State Street Property
Owners Association and the Department of Subways and
Traction of the City of Chicago seeking his services. He chose
the City, and had three requirements: (1) City to establish a
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Although the Chicago Subway construction was underway
when Peck arrived on January 17, 1939, the boring program
that included the sampling and soil testing required by
Terzaghi, had only recently begun, so this occupied the
immediate efforts of the Soil Mechanics Laboratory. Peck
supervised a team of young engineers selected from City
applicants, preferably those who had master’s degrees or had
taken a course in soil mechanics. Two-in.-dia. seamless
Shelby tubes were obtained from the borings and, later, block
samples and water content samples were collected from the
tunnels.. Testing was focused on unconfined compression tests
and water contents to evaluate stiffness and yield strength of
the clay and the details of its vertical and lateral variability.

CHICAGO SUBWAY ALIGNMENT
Most of the Chicago Subway alignment was at a depth to
tunnel crown of 25 feet. One of the reasons for such a shallow
tunnel depth compared to current subway projects is
understood when you realize that access to the subway is by
walking down stairs, rather than riding escalators. Another
positive effect of the shallow depth was that the heave and
settlement troughs due to tunneling were largely contained
within the street and sidewalk right of way and had less impact
on buildings. Additionally, the work rules for compressed air
pressures in the tunnel made it more expensive to tunnel at
more than 15 psi, and the air pressures less than 15 psi were
not able to fully balance the higher stresses at depth.
There were difficulties and challenges with the shallower
tunnel depth. The medium to very soft Chicago Clay (CL to
CH), extends from a depth of approximately 20 to 60 feet over
much of downtown Chicago. The clay was deposited as
Deerfield and Blodgett Tills beneath glacial Lake Chicago in
the later stages of the Wisconsinan Glaciation as the ice
receded into the Lake Michigan basin. In downtown Chicago
(South of the Chicago River, largely within the Loop) the
shallow depth put the full tunnel face in the soft clay whereas
north of the Chicago River the lower portion of the tunnel was
in older, overconsolidated stiff to hard clay tills.
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One of Terzaghi’s early questions was which tunnels could be
constructed by means of the light liner-plate method and
where it would be necessary to use the more expensive shield
method ($270/ft of tube versus $580/ft of tube, respectively).
Eight-ft-wide freight tunnels had been constructed at the turn
of the century in downtown Chicago with vertical sidewalls on
the soft clay bottom using compressed air and daily casting of
the concrete lining up to the face. Sewer tunnels had been
constructed in Chicago with the liner plate method for the
previous twenty years. However, it was concluded that the
larger subway tunnels could not be constructed by the liner
plate method in downtown Chicago. Terzaghi’s analysis
showed that the bearing capacity of the soft clay beneath the
side wall foot blocks was too low to safely support the post
loads from the larger subway tunnels (Terzaghi, 1942a).
Thus, in downtown Chicago, on Contract S-3 on State Street
and on Contract D-1 on the Dearborn Street Line, tunneling
was accomplished with the shield method. North of the
Chicago River, on contracts D-3 and D-5 on the Dearborn
Street Line, and S4b, S-5, S-6, and S-7 on the State Street
Line, the liner plate method was used, because the stiff to hard
clays in the invert provided bearing for the vertical posts. In
both projects, compressed air was used with air pressures kept
to less than 15 psi. In Fig 1, running tunnels are shown in red,
tunneled stations in blue, and braced cuts in green. River
crossings were dredged for immersed tubes.

Doors on the face of the shield occupied up to 20% of the area
of the face (Fig.2). Through these doors the soft clay
squeezed as the shield was shoved forward. As the shield was
advanced the effort was to hold the heave of the street surface
to less than four inches. Heave of sidewalk vaults was
reduced by filling them with 4 feet of sandbags. Harder clays
or other obstructions, such as occasional temporary timber
support in the abandoned freight tunnel, passing through the
shield doors could restrict flow and cause additional heave,
which was controlled largely by mining out ahead of the doors
to relieve pressures. The 3-in. gap between the tail of the
shield and lining was filled with pea gravel. The heave was
followed by an even larger settlement due to consolidation of
the clay with time following passage of the shield. Figure 3
shows (A) heave of 0.16 feet as the first shield passes
followed by (B) rapid settlement of 0.12 feet over a period of
11 days (some likely due to ground loss at the tail) then (C)
0.3 feet of heave as the second shield passes, followed, over a
period of 6 months, by (D) a settlement that dropped the street
surface 0.5 feet below its original level (Terzaghi, 1942b).

Fig. 2: Shield tunnel on Contracts S 3 and D-1
(after Terzaghi, 1942b)

Fig.1: Chicago Subway construction contracts, 1939-1941
(After Terzaghi, 1942a)

SHIELD TUNNELS
In downtown Chicago, the shallow tunnel depth not only
placed the shield tunnels within the soft clay but also directly
in the path of the 8-ft-wide freight tunnels located down the
center of every major street. The tunnels were demolished
ahead of the advancing shields, removing the concrete and
filling the tunnels with sand, which typically resulted in
settlement of 0.5 to 2 inches.
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A. Day 1: (7-19-40): Heave as 1st shield passes
B. ~Day 11: Position of street surface immediately prior to 2nd shield
C. Day 12: (8-1-40): Position of street surface at time of
maximum heave due to 2nd shield passage
D. Day 195: (1-30-41) Position of street surface prior to air removal

.
Fig. 3: Chicago Subway shield tunnel: heave and settlement
(after Terzaghi, 1942b)
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Terzaghi (1942b) attributed the consolidation to remolding of
the clay in a thin zone around the perimeter of the shield.
More recent experience in Chicago clay, monitoring
piezometers and extensometers around advancing shields
shows that consolidation will occurs as a result of stress
increases due to the shoving, which can be first exhibited as an
excess pore pressure, beginning as much as 4 diameters ahead
of the shield in a zone of influence of several diameters around
the tunnel, with consolidation occurring as the excess pore
pressure dissipates. Additionally, if the lining is permeable,
additional consolidation occurs due to drainage into the tunnel
as pore pressures drop below ambient levels and effective
stresses increase (Kawamura and Cording, 1999).

LINER PLATE TUNNELS
Liner plate tunnels were constructed north of downtown
Chicago (North of the Chicago River and the Loop), In this
region, the depth of the soft clay thinned so that the lower
portion of the tunnel face transitioned from the soft clay into
older stiff to hard clay tills. This allowed the use of the less
expensive basket-shaped liner-plate tunnels in which the
tunnel arch was supported on posts along the sidewalls
standing on wooden foot blocks in the stiffer clay bottom. The
tunnels were sequentially excavated by hand mining, first
advancing the top face and installing the steel rib arch on 2-ft
2-in. centers with liner plates set between the flanges.

mechanical assist provided by a cable extending to a drum on
an air tugger. For each of the miners, there were typically two
loaders to carry the clay and dump it in muck cars. In the arch,
the liner plate was bolted to the previous ring, which provided
immediate cantilever support, and the new arch rib was
temporarily supported on the floor of the top face by foot
blocks and radial timber braces. The radial braces were
setting on the soft clay surface and were close the vertical
intermediate face, and therefore had the potential for allowing
settlement of the tunnel crown.
The timber braces and foot blocks in the top face were
removed as the intermediate face was advanced and load from
the arch rib was transferred to the ribs on the side walls. These
processes of support, excavation, and re-support resulted in
further settlement. The invert section and the bottom lateral
braces against the invert section were left in place until just
before the concrete invert was placed (Fig. 5).
Throughout, air pressure was typically maintained at 12 to 14
psi, which provided some support of the tunnel face and arch
and reduced the loads on the footings beneath the sidewall
posts. The air pressure also limited movement of the clay into
the tunnel. As noted in the squeeze reports, often the gap
between the clay and the installed lining was not filled
promptly so that the clay was not in contact with the lining
and the air pressure was the sole internal support until the clay
surface came in contact with the lining. In some cases, where
harder clays were present near the bottom, the liner plate was
not extended to the bottom of the side wall.
A typical day’s advance would be 20 to 30 feet. Pouring of a
concrete invert and concrete arch could follow as closely as
the following shift or day; however, on State Street, near
Chicago Ave, the liner plate tunnel heading on Contract S-5
was 60 to 150 feet ahead of the arch concreting operation in
all four headings, which contributed to the large settlements
that developed over a distance of Xxxx when blowouts into
utilities in the street caused a loss of air pressure to 9-10 psi.

Fig. 4: Photo of sequential excavation (liner plate tunnel)
Figure 4 shows the labor intensive operation (there are 15
miners in the picture). Miners cut the clay into sausage-like
pieces, using a clay knife consisting of a loop of steel with a
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Fig. 5: Sequential heading and bench excavation ,
liner plate tunnel on Contract S 5 (Terzaghi, 1942a)
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SQUEEZE TESTS: RELATING CONSTRUCTION TO
GROUND LOSS AND SETTLEMENT
At the time of his December, 1938 lecture, Terzaghi visited an
access tunnel being driven from a construction shaft to the line
of the subway tunnel. He suggested to the resident engineer
that the cause of the surface settlements be investigated by
driving spearheads attached to wires ahead of the tunnel face
to determine if the clay was displacing into the tunnel
excavation during mining. He was provided with the results
on his first consulting visit, in late January, 1939, which
showed as much as 0.2 feet of displacement toward the tunnel
face as the tunnel heading was advanced (Peck, 1975).
In Terzaghi’s early visits, he discussed with Raymond Knapp
and Ralph Peck guidelines for “squeeze tests” to measure
ground movements into the tunnel as the excavation stages
were advanced. Peck proceeded to set up and conduct the
squeeze tests. The first four squeeze tests, in the period April
through August, 1939, were carried out on Contract S-5, the
first tunnel section mined on State Street north of the River.
Observations were carried out continuously over a period of
24 to 72 hours during the multiple stages of excavation and
support as the tunnel was advanced. In a typical squeeze test,
spearheads were driven into the clay approximately 6 to 10
feet ahead of the excavation face to measure axial
displacements into the tunnel as the heading was advanced to
the location of the spearhead. Rods were embedded 2 feet into
the clay in the crown of the tunnel to measure crown
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settlement and into the clay at several locations in both walls
of the tunnel to measure the horizontal displacement across the
width of the tunnel using a tape measure.
At the same time, settlements were surveyed across the width
of the street every 20 feet along the alignment.. Samples were
taken in the tunnel to determine the profile of water content
and strength. Throughout, the details of the excavation and
support procedures and the location and timing of the multiple
excavation stages were recorded. Peck summarized the results
on a single blueprint showing a profile and cross-section of the
tunnel excavation sequences and displacements of the clay
into the tunnel with time, a profile of the clay strength and
water content and surface settlement profiles (Soil Mechanics
Laboratory, 1939-1941). Figure 6 shows a portion of the
information recorded on the drawing for the fourth (August
14-15, 1939) squeeze test. (Crown settlements are highlighted
in red, and wall closure in purple, with their locations circled
shown on the cross section and longitudinal profile of
excavation progress.)
On Terzaghi’s next visit, Peck presented him with the
blueprint for the April, 1939 squeeze test accompanied by a
narrative of the construction events and test procedures. Peck
has commented in several lectures and papers that Terzaghi
“concealed his pleasure at the results with some difficulty,”
and he noted the growing respect and confidence that
Terzaghi, Peck, and Knapp had in their collaborative effort
(Peck, 1975).

5

YOU SHOULD ASSUME THE DATA IS RIGHT
UNTILYOU HAVE PROVEN THAT IT IS WRONG
Geotechnical engineers are well aware of how Peck used his
lectures not only to communicate lessons learned but to point
the way to the future of the profession. His lecture upon
receiving the Distinguished Alumnus Award from the
University of Illinois College of Engineering was entirely
dedicated to describing the lessons he had learned from his
mistakes. Few geotechnical engineers would voluntarily give
such a lecture.

Peck concluded his lectures with the advice he received from
Terzaghi: “You should assume the data is right until you have
proven that it is wrong.”

CONTRACT S-5: THE CAUSES OF LARGE SURFACE
SETTLEMENTS ARE IDENTIFIED
Figures 6, 7, and 8 were all obtained from the large drawing
Peck prepared for the August 14-15, 1939 squeeze test at
Station 172. Figure 8 shows the surface settlements.

In his lectures on the Chicago Subway squeeze tests, including
the Wilson Lecture in 1989, Peck described the lesson he
learned from Terzaghi regarding the interpretation of the
squeeze test data. For all four squeeze test sections conducted
on Contract S-5 (from April through August, 1939), Peck had
drawn smooth curves through the data for crown settlement
and sidewall closure. Fig. 6 shows the data for the August 1415, 1939 squeeze test.
In September, 1939, Terzaghi prepared a long report in which
he evaluated the squeeze test data. Instead of smooth curves,
he re-plotted the curves to go through the data points
(illustrated by the red lines added to the crown settlement in
Figure 7). (The distances of the faces ahead of the crown
settlement point are also shown in red.) Peck had argued that
difficulty in making the measurements caused variations on
the order of + 1/4 of an inch, which did not represent real
behavior. Terzaghi showed that there was a consistent
reversal of displacements.
As excavation was carried
downward and the walls moved in, the tunnel would oval and
crown would temporarily displace upward. Similarly, with
further advance of the headings, downward movement of the
crown would cause a temporary outward wall movement,
often occurring at the same time at different locations in the
tunnel section, which was considered indicative of a sudden
yielding of the clay.

Fig. 8: Surface settlements after excavating 1st & 2nd tubes
Contract S-5, August 14-15, 1939 (2nd tube squeeze test).
This squeeze test was conducted in the north heading of the
Northbound (NB) tube, which was the second of the twin
tubes mined at this location. The two tubes were built
immediately adjacent to each other, with a common central
wall. The first (SB) tube had produced a settlement of 5 in.
The additional surface settlement of the NB tube on August
14-15 was 2.2 in. (Fig. 8).
The second tube of the twin tube sections on Contract S-5
(where tubes were constructed immediately adjacent to each
other) produced lesser settlements than the first tube because
there were no lateral displacements at the wall of the second
tube that was adjacent to the first tube and the loads over the
second tube arched onto the concrete lining of the first tube so
that there was no soil to be compressed at that side of the
tunnel. (On Contract D-3 and D-5, where tubes were
separated, by approximately 8 feet, the settlement of the 2nd
tube was larger than the 1st due to compression of the pillar).

Fig. 7: Contract S-5, August 14-15, 1939 replotting of crown
settlement curves to go through all data points.
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The squeeze tests in the NB tunnel corresponding to the 2.2in. surface settlement are shown in Figures 6 and 7. The
crown settlement for the second tube was 3 inches which
began as the crown rib was excavated, when the timber braces
supporting the steel arch in the tunnel crown would have been
removed. The maximum side wall closure was 7/8 in.
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Throughout, Peck used the squeeze test measurements to
compute the volume lost (VL) into the tunnel and compare it to
the volume of the surface settlement trough (V S) and found
that the values were equivalent, an indication that the ground
movements into the tunnel were the cause of surface
settlement. (For the August 14-15, 1939 squeeze test, is
estimated at 13.3 cu ft/ft for the 1st, SB tube. For the 2nd, NB
tube, VS was 6.8 cu ft/ft, which is close to VL of 5.2 cu ft/ft
measured with the squeeze tests in the second tube.
Additional squeeze that may occur prior to establishing the
points in the tunnel is not included in calculation of VL.)

face had been excavated, a 10x10-in. timber strut was
extended across the excavation to prevent inward movement
of the side walls.

Large displacements into the tunnel and large surface
settlements were also measured in the other three squeeze tests
conducted on Contract S-5 between April and August, 1939.
The squeeze test reports showed that much of the settlement
was occurring as the arch ribs were undermined and resupported. Additionally, a large gap and incomplete filling
between the erected liner plate and clay was allowing inward
displacement of the clay,

CONTRACT S-6: SETTLEMENTS REDUCED BY
ADDITION OF A MONKEY DRIFT & WALL BEAM
Fig. 10: Monkey drift & wall plate.
Based on the observations on Contract S-5, the excavation
sequence on Contract S-6 and all other subsequent tunnel
contracts was changed to include a wall beam placed in two
monkey drifts (Fig, 9 and 10).

Figure 11, is an 8-1/2 by 11 blue print prepared by Chester P.
Siess for the squeeze tests on Contract S-6, at Station 201+40
during passage of the 2nd (NB) tube, South heading, March
27-29, 1940. (Siess was a member of Peck’s team and a
specialist in the use of the Whittemore gauge, a mechanical
gauge used to determine stresses from measurement of
displacements over a gauge length on steel sections. He went
on to earn his PhD and to specialize in reinforced concrete
structures, becoming Professor and Head of the University of
Illinois Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering.)

Fig. 9: 21- x 20-ft Liner plate tunnel with monkey drift
The monkey drifts were approximately 3.5 ft wide by 5 ft high
and located at the base of the arch. They were mined ahead of
the crown face (usually referred to as a top heading) so that a
continuous wall beam could be installed before the crown face
was excavated (Fig. 9 and 10). Then, as the crown face was
excavated, the steel rib arch was set directly on the wall beam.
Thus, as the side drifts and intermediate and lower faces were
excavated beneath the arch, the wall beam would span the
excavation increment and support the arch so that the posts
could be placed below the wall beam. Once the intermediate
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Fig. 11: Squeeze test for liner plate tunnel with monkey drifts
Contract S-6 Sta. 202+00 to 202+40, 2nd (NB) Tube, S. Head.

7

Cross sections at 20-foot intervals in the street showed only
small settlements: 0.8-in. settlement for the 1st, SB tube and
an additional settlement of 0.5 in. as the 2 nd, NB tube passed
during the squeeze test. The squeeze measurements in the NB
tubel also showed small displacements. Crown settlement was
7/8 in. and lateral closure between the side walls ranged from
3/8 in. to 1/8 in. from top to the bottom of the wall.
(The surface settlement volume (V S for the 1st, SB tube is
estimated as 2.7 cu ft/ft. Vs for the 2nd, NB tube is 1.3 cu ft/ft,
approximately equal to VL estimated from the squeeze tests.
The 2nd tube was excavated immediately adjacent to the first
tube, resulting in smaller settlement for the 2 nd tube.

On both of these contract sections, the tunnels were in a twin
tube configuration where the second tunnel was excavated
immediately adjacent to the first, so that, on both contracts, the
2nd tube had smaller settlements. For the 2nd tube settlements
on Contract S-6, which had the monkey drift and wall beam,
were in the range of 1 to 1.5 in., which were less than the 2 to
5 in. settlements on Contract S-5 where there was no monkey
drift (Fig. 12b).

CONTRACTS D-5 AND D-3: EFFECT OF TUNNEL
DEPTH ON GROUND MOVEMENTS
As the liner plate tunnels were extended to the north on
Contract Sections S-6, S-7, D-3, and D-5, the Soil Mechanics
Laboratory continued to conduct squeeze tests, confirming the
beneficial effects of the monkey drift in reducing settlements,
but the Laboratory was also being relied upon to investigate
and help resolve problems where large settlements were
occurring despite the use of the monkey drift.
Ralph Peck, at the request of Ralph Burke, Chief Subway
Engineer, investigated and reported on the factors producing
settlements of excessive magnitude over the south heading of
the NB (1st) tube of Contract D3. The large displacements
started at Sta. 126, where the tunnel crown was 58 feet deep,
and increased in magnitude to Sta. 123 as the tunnel dropped
in elevation to pass beneath the Chicago River to the south.
Squeeze tests and observations were made at Sta. 126 on Nov
29-Dec 1, 1939 and supplemental observations were made at
Sta. 123 on Dec 18-19, 1939. At Sta. 126, Peck observed
ground movements and construction conditions contributing to
the large ground movements: “Energetic motion was observed
in all portions of the heading” in spite of the fact that the clay
at tunnel depth had unconfined compressive strength (UCS)
varying from 1.3 to 3.5 tsf. Squeeze tests showed inward
movement of the tunnel face of 0.4 in., tunnel crown
settlement of 1.2 in., and lateral wall convergence of 1 in.
Maximum surface settlement was 2.3 in. in 24 hours,
increasing to 3 in. in two weeks. Peck concluded that 48 to 66
% of the displacements occurred ahead of the face. (Soil
Mechanics Laboratory, Dec 19, 1939 report).

b. 2nd tube and total for 1st and 2nd tubes
Fig 12: Maximum surface settlements,
Contracts S-5 and S- 6 (after Terzaghi, 1942a)
Fig. 12 shows the dramatic reduction in the maximum surface
settlement on a 600-ft section of the S-6 contract, excavated
with the monkey drift and wall beam (Terzaghi, 1942a).
Settlements for the 1st tubes ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 in.,
whereas the adjacent 850-ft section of the S-5 contract
excavated without the monkey drift had surface settlements in
the range of 3 to 6 in. (Fig. 12a).
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Peck’s report describes the causes of the large settlement: As
was noted in earlier squeeze test reports, an excessive gap of 2
to 7 in. was being mined outside the lining in the crown and
there was a delay in filling it. (On a later contract, a simple
wooden template was extended ahead of the last rib to locate
the required excavation perimeter and limit over-excavation
during mining.) Filling of the gap could be accomplished by
placement of pea gravel, cement grout, or wood wedges. At
Sta. 126, pea gravel was being blown by air to fill the gap
between clay and the liner plates in the crown but was being
delayed as much as 18 feet behind the advancing crown face.
This meant that the clay squeeze was being initially balanced
by compressed air pressure alone and not supported by the
tunnel lining until the gap was closed.
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Additionally Peck noted that the intermediate face was being
held back as much as 9 ribs (approximately 19 feet), which
delayed the installation of the strut between the wall plates
(Fig. 9), so there was no restraint to prevent inward movement
of the wall beams in the monkey drifts, and liner plate was not
being placed on the wall behind the wall beams to spread the
lateral load and reduce squeezing of the clay.
Ground losses in the D-3 NB tunnel at Sta. 126 to 122 were
much larger than those in the D-3 SB tunnel at Sta. 122 (Table
1), even though the same tunneling methods were being used,
and both tunnels were being mined by the same crews, who
alternated between headings with the concrete crews. Peck
concluded that the difference was due to the increased depth
and correspondingly higher stresses around the NB tunnel.
Procedures acceptable under ordinary conditions (at the 25foot depth) must be drastically modified when the conditions
change. He noted that settlements of 1.5 to 2 in. were
inevitable because movements ahead of the face could not be
reduced without increased air pressure, but that settlements
due to displacements in the crown and sidewalls could be
reduced by (a) accurate, close excavation to reduce gap
between clay and liner plate, (b) immediate pea gravel
grouting and vibratory compaction between clay and liner
plate, (c) reducing length of intermediate face to a few feet so
that horizontal strut could be placed immediately, (d) placing
liner plate behind the wall beams to reduce the pressure of the
clay against the wall beam.
Table 1 has been compiled from the squeeze reports and
compares ground movements for the deep D-3 and S-4b
tunnels driven south toward the river with the S-5 and S-6
tunnels and the shallower D-5 tunnels to the north.
Table 1: Influence of Tunnel Depth, D,
on Surface Settlement, Ss
Station
Tube
D
Normal 25’ tube depth
S5: 172
1st
25’
S6: 180
1st
25’
Shallow tubes, near N end
D5:209
1st NB
16’
D5:207
2nd SB
19’
D5:207
1st NB
19’
Deep tubes S toward River
D3: 126
1st NB
58’
D3: 122
1st NB
61’
D3: 122
2nd SB
37’
D3: 118
1st NB
65’
S4b:134
1st NB
44’
S4b:134
2nd SB
44’

Pa
psi
12
12

UCS
tsf
0.4
0.5

OSR

9.5
9
9

0.45
0.5
0.5

1.4
2.2
2.2

0”
1”

0.3”
1.1”
0.9”

0.2%
0.8%
0.6%

14
12
12
12
12
12

1.2
1
0.5
1
0.5
0.5

4.3
5.9
5.7
6.4
7.5
7.5

1.3”

2-3”
5”
1.3”
1.2”
6”
2”

3.1%
7.2%
1.3%
1.8%
6.9%
2.3%

4.6
2.8

Crn
3”

1.7”
1.2”
1.8”

Settlement
Ss
Vs%
3-6”
4.9%
2”
1.6%

Key: Depth to crown: D; Air pressure: Pa; Unconfined
compressive strength: UCS, (upper face); Overstress ratio in
upper face: OSR = (h – pa)/0.5UCS: h: overburden stress.
OSR in excess of 6 indicates bearing failure & squeezing
(Peck, 1969).Crown settlement: Crn; Max. surface settlement:
Ss; Volume settlement trough: Vs% (% of tunnel volume)
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The squeeze tests in Contract S-5 had large ground losses
(Vs% = 5%) which were reduced to less than 2% on Contract
S-6 when the monkey drift was used to minimize settlement of
the tunnel crown. The effects of tunnel depth and high
overstress ratio (OSR) can also be seen in Table 1. Vs% was
less than 1% for Contract D-5 near the north end of the
Dearborn Street tunnels, where tunnel depth was only 16 to 19
feet, and the OSR was low (in the range of 1.4 to 2.2).
For the deeper tunnels approaching the river on Contracts S4b
and D3, the air pressures were not increased but maintained at
less than the 15 psi limit, thus the increasing overburden
forces were not proportionally balanced by an increase in air
pressure. As a result, the overstress ratio, OSR, increased
above 5 or 6, the clay squeezed, and the surface settlement
volume, Vs, increased. The deeper tunnels showed larger
surface settlements, Ss, than the shallower tunnels, despite the
fact that the increased depth spread the surface settlement over
a larger trough width. As Peck recommended, in the absence
of increased air pressures, the deeper tunnels required more
stringent measures to install the liner plates and ribs early and
tight to the clay in order to reduce settlements. Apparently,
this recommendation was followed in the NB D-3 tunnel at
Sta. 118, where Vs% was 1.8% despite the greater depth.

WASHINGTON METRO: 1970-1973
It was in the classroom that we were introduced to soft ground
tunneling, taught by Professor Peck from the perspective of
his pioneering investigations on the Chicago Subway. It
wasn’t until I was a faculty member, directing the University
of Illinois contract for geotechnical monitoring on Washington
Metro Phase I soft ground tunnels and stations in rock caverns
and braced excavations in soil that I had my first opportunity
to be in the field with Ralph Peck. He was a member of the
Washington Metro Board of Consultants and would make it a
point, early in the morning prior to board meetings, to walk
with us through the construction sites. I recall a bright winter
morning in 1972; Bill Hansmire and I picked up Ralph Peck at
his hotel and we went down into the heading of the shield
tunnel on Contract A-2. We then came out of the shaft,
crossed Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, and
walked to our array of extensometers and inclinometers in the
middle of Lafayette Square where we discussed our
monitoring results and observations, the topic of Bill’s thesis.
At the start of our soft ground tunneling experience, we were
receiving the benefit of 30 years of tunnel observations. What
a valuable experience those visits were for us, but I expect that
Ralph Peck valued them as well. No matter how many board
rooms he sat in over the years, his priority was to go to the
site, observe and listen.
The Washington Metro investigation built on the Chicago
Subway experience of observing and recording construction
events and correlating the volume of ground loss with the
volume of surface settlement. In Chicago, the volume of
ground loss was measured within the tunnel. On the
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Washington Metro, the ground loss and three-dimensional
distribution of ground movements was measured with
borehole extensometers and inclinometers surrounding the
advancing tunnel shield. Just in time for use on our test
section, Stan Wilson, inventor of the slope indicator and
partner in Shannon and Wilson, Inc. and Slope Indicator Co., ,
informed us that the Digitilt inclinometer, using a servoaccelerometer to measure tilt, had been developed. It was
capable of measuring slopes with a precision of 1/10,000, an
order of magnitude better than could be measured with thenexisting slope indicators, and precise enough to measure
lateral displacements around braced excavations and tunnels.
The inclinometer was immediately incorporated into our
instrumentation plans for the tunnels and braced excavations.
The digger shield had an open face which, in some cases,
could result in inflows and ground loss, but also provided the
opportunity to observe the ground and its behavior. The soils
were Terrace deposits of stiff clay and dense sand. The tunnel
support consisted of 6 in. circular steel ribs spaced 4 ft on
center with timber lagging between the ribs, which were
installed inside the tail section of the shield and then expanded
against the ground as the shield advanced forward.
Digital readouts of machine functions did not exist at the time,
so Bill Hansmire, was in the tunnel recording items the shield
plumb bob readings and the position of the laser line on the
two clear plastic targets on the front and back of the shield to
determine the position of the shield and its angle of attack.
The data showed that the shield was inclined at an angle in
excess of tunnel grade, 12 in. higher at the front than the back
end of the shield in order to maintain grade with the extended
hood, which gave the shield a tendency to dive. He also kept
track of the location and the time that the shield was shoved
and called the information up to those reading the inclinometer
immediately in front of the tunnel shield to make sure that the
inclinometer torpedo was pulled out of the casing before the
shield cut through it so that the torpedo did not end up being
excavated with the muck.
By measuring the instruments at least once during every 4-foot
shove of the shield, the source of the ground loss could be
pinpointed (Fig. 13). The large 6-in. surface settlement did
not occur due to soil displacing into the open face of the shield
as might have been expected, but was occurring over the
shield. Almost every shove of the shield was causing large
settlement of the extensometer anchor located immediately
above the shield. From the front to the back of the shield, the
deep settlement totaled 13 in. (Cording and Hansmire, 1975).
The inclinometer in the path of the shield showed a lateral
displacement of only 1/4 in. toward the face, confirming that
the ground movement into the face was small and was not the
source of the large ground losses (Fig. 13).
Based on the observations on the first tunnel drive, the
contractor rebuilt the shield hood for the second drive, so that
the shield could be driven on grade without plowing. As a
result, surface settlements were reduced from 6 to 2 in.
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Fig. 13: Washington, D.C. Metro, Contract A2, Lafayette
Square Test Section, 1st tunnel

GROUND CONTROL WITH ADVANCES IN SHIELD
TUNNELING METHODS
The standard set on the Chicago subway squeeze tests was to
continuously monitor and observe both ground behavior and
construction conditions in the liner plate tunnels. The
Washington Metro test sections set a standard for monitoring
ground movements around an advancing shield.
A revolution in ground control has been developing since the
advent of pressurized face shields (earth pressure balance or
slurry shields) and it continues with improved understanding
of the machine functions that must be controlled and
monitored to achieve ground control. The understanding is
aided by use of observational approaches pioneered on the
Chicago subway and used on the Washington Metro.
Observations have gone from timing and recording
construction events in notebooks to digitally recording key
machine functions in real time and archiving them for future
use. Pressurized face shields have a chamber behind the
cutterhead in which the conditioned muck is held at pressures
that balance groundwater and effective earth pressures,
reducing the risk and magnitude of ground loss. The ground in
the face cannot be regularly observed and reliance must be
placed on the digital record.
The digital information is comprehensive and outstanding and
can be overwhelming. However, in the past few years,
manufacturers, owner’s representatives, and contractors have
improved the use and understanding of the key machine
functions controlling ground movements. Contractors have
engaged their engineers and operators in a team effort to set
target levels for the key functions controlling ground behavior,
and adjust and respond in real time to the conditions
encountered.
The following paragraphs summarize improvements in ground
control and reductions in ground loss that have been achieved
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in the past 70 years. Ground loss, VL, as it was described by
Peck in 1939, is the volume of ground that moves into the
tunnel perimeter. The volume of the surface settlement trough,
Vs, = VL-- V where V is an increase in volume of the soil
mass. For dense sands, a significant expansion of the soil
above the tunnel can occur. For soft clays, consolidation will
cause a reduction in volume. Most of the tunneling industry
reports the percentage of ground loss as the volume of the
surface settlement trough with respect to the tunnel volume.
However, measurement of deep settlements with
extensometers allows VL to be estimated as the shield passes,
so that an understanding of the sources of ground loss and the
effects of volume change in the soil mass can be assessed.
Examples of surface settlement volumes percentages that have
been achieved in the past 70 years are summarized below.
1939: Chicago subway: Squeeze tests led to a reduction in
surface settlement from approximately 6 in. to 2 in., and Vs%
reduced from 5% to 2%.
1972: Washington Metro: Extensometers and inclinometers
showed that ground loss of 5% on the first tunnel drive
occurred over the shield, and was subsequently reduced to 2%
on the 2nd drive.
1994-2000: Evanston sewer tunnels, in deep deposit of soft
Chicago Clay, Piezometers as well as extensometers and
inclinometers showed the causes of consolidation during
tunneling. 12-ft-dia wheeled excavator shield, 4 in. steel ribs,
4 ft on center with timber lagging: Following was observed for
the 60’ deep tunnel (Srisirirojanakorn, 2005):
1. Immediate ground loss, largely due to 3/ 4” overcut:
Surface settlement, Ss = 0.8 to 1.2” (Volume of overcut
gap is always lost on non-pressurized shields).
2. Test section 3: Consolidation due to stress change and
drainage through the permeable lining:
Additional time-dependent settlement: Ss =1.3”
VL +V = 5 cu ft/ft + 8 cu ft/ft; Vs=14 cu ft/ft.
3. Test Section 4: Drainage prevented by placing a
membrane around the steel ribs and lagging.
Consolidation due to stress change only
Additional time dependent settlement: Ss =1.0”
VL +V = 4 cu ft/ft + 4 cu ft/ft = 10 cu ft/ft
2000: In recent years designers on a number of tunnel projects
have assumed that ground losses, Vs, of 1% can be achieved
with pressurized face tunneling, based on a review of previous
experience. For a transit tunnel at depths of approximately two
or three diameters, this typically results in surface settlements
on the order of one inch. In some of these cases, additional
ground control measures, such as compensation grouting, are
used to further reduce the settlements beneath structures.

compensation grouting was installed beneath structures near
the start of the tunnel drive, it did not need to be used. As a
result of this and other recent EPBM experience, design values
for maximum ground loss (Vs%) on several current projects
have been reduced to 0.5% or less, and expectations are that
smaller ground losses can be regularly achieved.
Extensometers to measure ground loss immediately above the
shield are being used on many projects, but often, the
frequency of measurements has not been sufficient to locate
the sources of the ground loss around the shield and results are
not correlated with the key machine functions that limit
ground loss. Without understanding what controls ground loss,
the designer is reduced to estimating it based on summaries
from other projects. The approach does not lead to an
understanding of the requirements for controlling ground loss
in different ground conditions. Uncertainty regarding the
ground control that the contractor can achieve in the tunnel
may lead to specification of additional ground control
measures such as compensation grouting. Observations on the
following two projects provided detailed information on the
EPBM functions that limited ground loss to negligible values.
2011-2012: EBP tunnels in Seattle and Toronto:
comprehensive test sections were established prior to passing
beneath structures; in the first case to verify that settlement
over the shield was prevented by filling and pressurizing the
large overcut gap with conditioned muck from the tunnel face
(Diponio, et al, 2012), and in the second case to determine that
the tunnels could be advanced at shallow depth beneath
foundations of a structure without damaging settlement and
without additional ground protection measures.
.
In both cases, machine functions were continuously read that
showed not only that face pressures were consistently
maintained within target levels both during and after shoving
of the shield, but pressures were read and samples taken in the
gap around the body of the shield showing that it was
immediately filled and pressurized with conditioned muck or
bentonite. was injected into the gap. Finally, as is now
standard in pressurized face shield tunneling, grout was
continuously injected through the tail of the shield to fill and
pressurize the gap between the shield and the segmental lining
as the shield advanced. Thus a pressurized envelope was being
maintained at all times around the entire shield.
Machine monitoring data were correlated with continuous
monitoring of ground behavior as the tunnel shield approached
and passed the test sections– extensometers and surveys for
settlements and piezometers to monitor the advancing pressure
wave in the ground water. Ground losses of zero to 0.15%,
were consistently achieved, and tunneling beneath the
structures was accomplished without significant settlement
and with no damage.

2006: On the 1.8 miles of twin tunnel on the Los Angeles
Metro Gold Line Eastside Extension, surface settlements were
in the range of 0 to 0.3 in. over the entire alignment, giving a
surface volume typically less than 0.25%. Although
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CHICAGO SUBWAY INVESTIGATIONS SET THE
STANDARD
For the past 70 years, the pioneering work of Karl Terzaghi
and Ralph Peck and the Chicago Subway Soil Mechanics
Laboratory has set the standard for the investigation and
control of ground movements due to tunneling, and for
geotechnical investigations, in general. Peck stated it well in
his keynote speech at the Geo-Engineering Conference in
Urbana,
“The Chicago Subway project in the annals of
geotechnical engineering assumed an importance far beyond
its benefits at the time, largely because it demonstrated the
enormous practical benefits that occur from even crude
observations, crude at least in comparison to today’s
sophisticated instrumentation. Even today, it exemplifies the
benefits that may be derived from simple but intelligently
interpreted observations” (Peck, 1999).
He went on to say: “I have had a 60-year love affair with
subway tunnels. The state of the art has changed radically but
the rate of change has not perceptibly decreased... most of the
changes have not been drive by advances in theory, but by
observations based on experience.”

DiPonio, M. A., G. Frank, E.A. Gharahbagh, and E. Cording
[2012], “Settlement Risk of Extended Overcut in Dense
Soils”, Proceedings, North American Tunneling Conference,
Indianapolis, pp 54-64.
Dunnicliff, J. and N. P. Young, ed. [2006], “Ralph B. Peck,
Educator and Engineer”, BiTech Publ, Ltd., Vancouver, B.C.
Kawamura, N. and E. J. Cording [1999], “Long-Term
Behavior of Tunnels in Chicago Clay”, Proc. National Conf.
Geo-Eng for Underground Facilities, University of Illinois,
ASCE Special Geotech Publ 90, pp 866-878.
Knapp, R.S. [1940], “Settlements due to Subway Construction
in Clay”, Proceedings Purdue Conf. on Soil Mechanics and Its
Applications, Section VI, pp 1008-1036.
Knapp, R.S. and R.B. Peck [1941], “Open Cut Soil Pressures
on Chicago Subway”, Engineering News-Record, Nov. 20.
Peck, R.B. [1942], “Earth-Pressure Measurements in Open
Cuts, Chicago (Ill.) Subway”, Proc. ASCE, vol. 68, no 6, pp
862-898.

Throughout his career, Peck was a practicing engineer and an
educator; the two were inseparable. It was apparent that he
considered teaching --from theory to practice-- the most
important part of his University life. He believed that
judgment, or its foundations, could be taught: “There is
actually such a thing as engineering judgment and it is
indispensable to the successful practice of engineering.”

Peck, R.B. [1969], “Deep Excavation and Tunneling in Soft
Ground”, State of the Art Volume, 7th Intl. Conf. Soil Mech.,
Mexico, pp 225-290.

Professor Peck communicated those principles in the
classroom: when we finished his case history course we had
served on his Board of Consultants, participating with him on
virtual tours of his projects, observing, and making
engineering judgments. They were like detective stories; we
observed clues about the ground and its behavior; and I
wanted to solve them.

Peck, R.B. [1989], “Learning from the Ground, Use and
Misuse of Observational Data.” 1st Stanley D. Wilson lecture
(video), Seattle.

Forty years ago, on the Washington Metro, I and a whole
generation of our graduate students had the opportunity to
begin our love affair with subways, and subsequent
generations of students have followed. Over the years, many
of us, former students and engineering colleagues, had the
privilege of working with Ralph Peck on subways and many
other projects. His presence is missed, his lessons remain. In
commemorating Ralph B. Peck’s legacy we remind ourselves
of -- and introduce others to -- the lessons he learned and
taught to the profession.
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